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1 Introduction
Most organizations have more than one organizational objective (Cuccurullo and
Lega 2013; Denis et al. 2012). One possible structural solution to handle multiple
strategic objectives in small and large firms is the dual executive leadership
structure (i.e. co-CEO structure) (Alvarez and Svejenova 2005; Denis et al. 2012;
Reid and Karambayya 2009), in which the organization is led by two hierarchically
equivalent executives, each of whom is responsible for one of the main objectives.
Dual leadership can bring many advantages, resulting from the ability of the
individual managers to be more specialized than a single CEO could be, and also
because of the broader field of vision two managers with strongly different
perspectives will have together (Alvarez and Svejenova 2005; Fjellvaer 2010;
Heenan and Bennis 1999; Reid and Karambayya 2009).
Of course, compared to a single CEO, a dual executive leadership structure will
also increase the risk of disagreement (Reid and Karambayya 2009). When one
leader thinks achieving aim x is more important than aim y, he/she will want to
prioritize actions leading to x, while his/her colleague has the opposite opinion. This
can lead to fruitless conflict and issues with respect to politics and power
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992), but also useful tensions and the need to present
more evidence and stronger arguments for one’s views than a single CEO would do
(Amason and Sapienza 1997). However, a more insidious form of disagreement can
ensue from the two leaders having different interpretations of the ‘facts’ and
especially the ‘facts’ pertaining to their own organization’s past performance. As
Mezias and Starbuck (2003) already noted, managers within the same organization
often have a personal perception of the organization’s performance which may only
be weakly related to the organization’s real performance (see also: Denrell 2004;
Starbuck 2004).
The main aim of this study is to provide a better understanding of how dual
executive leaders create a personal perception of their organizations’ performance.
How can two managers at the same level in the organization be confronted with the
same performance indicators, and one conclude that they have done well and the
other that they have done poorly? Answering this question is important, because it
implies that it is not the factual organizational performance, but rather how specific
managers interpret signals about their organization’s performance that are the base
for future strategies and consequent choices with regard to resource allocation.
Since aligning strategy with performance measurements is often problematic
(Bagnoli and Vedovato 2014; Parisi 2013) it is essential to expand the management
literature with knowledge about the formation of perceptions of organizational
performance. To date, researchers mostly approached organizational performance
and signals of organizational performance only as an outcome variable and neglect
the role of managerial interpretations of organizational performance in the strategy
making process (for overview see e.g.: Combs et al. 2005; Maltz et al. 2003; Tosi
et al. 2000; Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986).
We will employ the theoretical framework of selection system theory (Priem
2007; Wijnberg and Gemser 2000) to investigate relation between manager’s
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selection system orientations (Bhansing et al. 2012)—the relative importance
managers attach to the evaluations of the three main selectors: market consumers,
experts and peers—and perception of organizational performance. One of the
advantages of selection system theory is that it allows distinguishing between three
clearly defined dimensions of performance that are linked to the three main types of
selectors. Organizations produce goods with characteristics that are more (or less)
likely to satisfy the preferences of each type of selector, and therefore the
organization’s performance can also be assessed along corresponding dimensions.
Organizations that perform well along the market dimension will have greater
attractiveness to the consumers themselves, usually shown by their products’
popularity and market share; those that perform well along the expert dimension
will gain more favorable expert evaluations, as shown by, for instance, reviews in
the media; those that perform well along the peer dimension are praised or rewarded
by their peers, for instance by being awarded peer awards. A selection system
orientation can be considered an important structural element of a mental model and
mental models play a key role in how managers interpret signals from their strategic
environment and, consequently, how they react to that environment (Daft and
Weick 1984; Dearborn and Simon 1958; Garg et al. 2003; Hambrick and Mason
1984; Jackson and Dutton 1988; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Lant 2002; March and
Simon 1958; Meyer 1982; Starbuck 1976; Walsh 1988; Weick et al. 2005).
Performance perceptions are based on the signals of performance that are
perceived and interpreted. The process of perception and interpretation of the
signals is subject to a degree of equivocality and uncertainty (Daft and Lengel
1986). In this study, we argue that perceptions of organizational performance can be
categorized along the three different dimensions of selection systems and that
signals that can be interpreted along these different dimensions lead to sensemaking
processes characterized by specific levels of equivocality and uncertainty. Precisely
because this study focuses on pairs of dual executive leaders who are responsible for
different functional areas in the same organization it allows for an investigation of
differences in managerial cognition concerning perceptions of performance, while
controlling for organizational characteristics and environment.
The setting for this empirical study is provided by performing arts organizations
in the UK in which dual leadership structures are widely used, and multiple
objectives and dimensions of performance are explicitly considered.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Selection system orientations
Selection system theory studies competitive processes by focusing on the actors
whose judgments determine the value of the goods that competitors produce (Priem
2007; Wijnberg and Gemser 2000). This theoretical framework suggests that a
major task for managers is to identify the dominant selectors: those actors whose
evaluations matter most to the organization realizing its objectives. Each manager
has beliefs about the extent to which his/her organization’s performance is primarily
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determined by the judgment of selectors of a particular type—market, expert or
peer—and these believes constitute their selection system orientation. Thus, top
managers who consider their organization’s success primarily dependent on the
market will give more credence to consumer awards and to revenue data. In
contrast, those whose selection systems are oriented towards experts will be most
concerned with reviews, awards by expert juries and opinions of scholars in their
field and those with high peer selection system orientations will be more concerned
with how managers in similar organizations evaluate them—as evidenced, for
instance, by industry association awards.
Selection system orientations are important in top managers’ strategy making
processes and decision-making. Mental models, such as orientations, provide
managers with an understanding of signals and important issues in their
organization’s environment (e.g. Hambrick and Mason 1984; Stubbart 1989; Weick
1995). Managers’ mental models are the ‘‘internal representations that individual
cognitive systems create to interpret the environment’’ (Denzau and North 1994,
p. 4), which they acquire through their work, training and broader life experience.
The mental model concept has been investigated under different names: schemas,
frames, dominant logics, cognitive maps and belief systems (e.g. Gary and Wood
2011). While many studies focus on the mental model at the individual level without
taking the subsequent interaction at the group level into full account, there are other
studies that focus precisely on processes of interaction and give attention to the
specificities of the discourse or the linguistic devices that are employed (e.g.
Cornelissen and Clarke 2010). Kwon et al. (2014), for instance, use a discourse-
historical approach to investigate how managers deploy a repertoire of discursive
strategies to create shared views around strategic issues and Kaplan (2008) shows
that managers interact with each other in a competitive process to make their
cognitive frames into the frames that are dominant in the organization. The mental
model individual and interactional approach may seem at odds, but one could
simply argue that one approach complements the other, since interpretations of
signals resulting from managers’ mental models such as selection system
orientations, shape and are shaped by the social process of interaction, as we will
discuss below.
2.2 Perception of organizational performance
Managers are involved in an ongoing process of recognizing a variety of signals in
their environment and comparing their perceptions of their organization’s current
and past performance, which allows them to understand more fully how effectively
they have used their resources and whether they have gained a competitive
advantage. Perceptions of performance are personal interpretations of signals that
indicate organizational performance. Such interpretations can guide organizational
actions, which in turn play a crucial role in realizing organizational objectives
(Hauser 2001). Studies concerning strategic control systems show the importance of
performance insight in strategizing (Atkinson 2006; Goold and Quinn 1990; Otley
1999; Tavakoli and Perks 2001). An organization’s performance shows its position
relative to its competitors and thus the areas where it may need to take strategic
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action. Organizational performance tells managers what organizational issues have
to be dealt with and which strategic actions have priority (see e.g. Kaplan and
Norton 1992). Previous research suggests that managers rely less on control system
information when environmental uncertainty is higher (Govindarajan 1984), that
their tolerance for ambiguity moderates the relationship between uncertainty and the
appropriateness of, for example, accounting performance measures (Hartmann
2005), and that different managers may also weigh different information sources
differently (Hauser 2001). In other words, the construction of managers’ perceptions
of organizational performance is a complicated process and those perceptions may
substantially deviate from their organization’s reported organizational performance
(Starbuck and Milliken 1988).
Selection system theory suggests that organizations may compete along different
performance dimensions. Similarly, Carton and Hofer (2006) suggest that an
organization can have different types of organizational performance that coexist,
and that each performance type may have multiple indicators. Organizations may
serve multiple groups—or stakeholders—which may hold different views about
what constitutes successful organizational performance and even within a specific
performance type, a number of indicators—each possibly containing multiple
measures—can be used to construct a perception of organizational performance.
Scholars also recognize that different types of organizational performance may be
essential for organizational survival (Drucker 1954), that organizations need to try
to realize both organizational objectives and stakeholders’ objectives (Freeman
1984), and that financial and non-financial performance measures can exist side by
side (Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986). Porac and Thomas (1990) also discuss
different categories of stakeholders and that organizations can compete for
organizational success in each category. Of course, signals of one performance
dimension may be easier to identify and assess than another.
Daft and Lengel (1986) identify two forces in organizations that influence
information processing: equivocality and uncertainty. Equivocality concerns the
potential ambiguity of information—while a signal may seem equally clear to
two managers, each may interpret it differently and so attribute different
meanings to it. Signals that increase equivocality are those that give ambiguous
information about an event, allowing multiple interpretations of a signal. High
equivocality can result in confusion and lack of understanding about (possibly
important) signals (Daft and Lengel 1986). Uncertainty denotes the perceived
availability of necessary information and has been defined as ‘‘the difference
between information possessed and information required to complete a task’’
(Downey and Slocum 1975: in Tushman and Nadler 1978, p. 615), and therefore
exists where individuals have to act and make decisions, but have less than
complete knowledge about the situation. A signal can explain an event to a
greater or lesser extent. The more signals that are noticed, the more likely it is
that a clear message emerges, but if the new signals are ambiguous, uncertainty
will be increased. Where uncertainty is high, decision makers may have to leave
questions unanswered (Daft and Lengel 1986).
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2.3 Dual leaders and perceived organizational performance
In a dual executive leadership structure, each of the dual executives will focus on
one particular set of issues and pay less attention to other areas. This structure also
implies functional assignment diversity in the top of the organization (Bunderson
and Sutcliffe 2002). Previous studies have shown that teams with high functional
assignment diversity have a higher degree of external communication (Ancona and
Caldwell 1992), and are more likely to perform well in a turbulent environment
(Keck 1997) and engage in strategic reorientation (Lant et al. 1992). Alvarez and
Svejenova (2005) suggest that role complementarity is a key advantage of the dual
leadership structure. However, this structure also brings other discrepancies in the
top of the organization and a potential danger of conflict between the representatives
of the two functions (Reid and Karambayya 2009). The dual leaders can be
dissimilar in many ways, with regard to demographic attributes, such as age or sex,
or with regard to attributes that directly represent cognitive attitudes and values (e.g.
Voss et al. 2006), such as selection system orientations. In addition, social
interactional processes in organizations, such as organizational politics, can result
from differences in the goals (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992) and cognitive frames
of decisions makers, and can lead to problems of coordination or wasteful power
struggles. Moreover, especially in dual leadership structures, the interaction
between social processes and cognitive frames may influence managers’ perceptions
of organizational performance.
Where selection system orientations affect the process of the interpretation of
signals, social interactional processes can affect both the strength of the selection
system orientations of the individual managers and the way in which different
perceptions of performance by different managers, resulting from different selection
system orientations, affect subsequent strategic choices of the organization they are
leading and, in turn, future performance. With regard to the social interactional
processes as antecedents of the strength of selection system orientation, we refer
back to the already cited studies by Kaplan (2008) and Kwon et al. (2014) about
how managers also compete in trying to force particular cognitive frames upon each
other. The consequences of social interactional processes on how the differences in
selection systems will affect the organization as a whole can be even more
significant. First, the larger the differences in perception of performance, the larger
the differences will be in respect to the strategic conclusions that can be drawn and
the greater the scope for social interaction to actually determine future choices;
second, the differences in perceived performance together with power struggles can
easily lead to difficulties in aligning business strategies with performance measures
and may consequently create an unreliable image of the organization in the eyes of
its stakeholders (Van Riel 2012).
In an earlier study, Bhansing et al. (2012) focused on the selection system
orientation of managers as a crucial part of the managers’ cognition and attitude,
precisely to investigate whether differences in respect to that attribute had an effect
on organizational performance. This study takes a step backwards, as it were, from
the question of the effect of heterogeneity among top managers on performance to
first ask the question whether the differences, with regard to selection system
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orientations among managers, leads to different perceptions of that performance.
When dual executive leaders both seek to make sense of the same event—the
current state of their organization’s performance—one may be strongly and the
other weakly oriented towards a specific type of selector. The selection system
orientations denote particular individual choices in respect to the bounded
rationality applied to seeking information and interpreting it. Signals are (uncon-
sciously) interpreted in the context of their different selection system orientations,
leading them to weigh and process the signals differently and identify different
cause-and-effect relationships based on their different presumptions about how the
signal has influenced the organization. In other words, dual leaders process the same
information differently, because their backgrounds have thought them to make sense
of information in a particular way, allowing more cognitive capacity to be allocated
to relations they understand well and signals they can interpret with more certainty
and less equivocality.
As mentioned before, the setting of this study is the performing arts and many
organizations in this industry have a dual executive leadership structure. In this
setting, the dual leaders, an artistic and managing director, may be asked how expert
critics have evaluated their organization over recent years, about which both will
have a perception. The artistic director may have a stronger expert orientation than
the managing director and values these signals differently, remembering that experts
evaluate the extent to which the organization is innovative as a sign of good
performance. The managing director may have an idea about the overall evaluations
that the organization has received from expert critics in the past year, and
remembers that this was lower than that accorded to other organizations, and
therefore may perceive the organization’s expert performance as poor: so the two
may believe different actions are necessary to create or sustain successful
organizational performance in the expert dimension. These considerations bring
us to the following hypothesis.
H1 Differences in dual leaders’ selection system orientations are positively related
to differences in their perceptions of the organization’s performance in the same
dimension.
2.4 Ambiguity and availability of signals
As mentioned before, each selection system dimension has different signals of
performance and these signals result in different levels of equivocality and
uncertainty (Table 1). Market data are comparatively unambiguous. It is often easily
available, clear and well defined and based on factual data such as sales figures (Daft
and Lengel 1986). Signals about expert performance are usually available, but the
assessment of specific signals may be open to more interpretations. Examples of
expert performance signals are newspaper reviews from expert critics (Deephouse
and Carter 2005), certification (Rao 1994) and opinions of other experts, such as
government subsidy organizations (Bhansing et al. 2012). Different experts often
have different opinions and different reviews may have different positives and
negatives. In such situations dual leaders may value the same signals in expert
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reviews differently. Perceptions of the organization’s peer performance can be
highly equivocal and highly uncertain and signals that are available often come in
many different forms, so it can be difficult to value it and assign weights. There are
few explicit signals except for peer awards, but even the information transmitted by
that signal can be considered far from clear or certain, compared to the signals
denoting performance along the other dimensions. For example, only a few
organizations gain peer awards in any year, so even the most high-performing
organizations will not receive one every year. The meaning of having received an
award in the past is more difficult to interpret than, for instance, past attendance
figures.
We expect that dual leaders perceive performance by using their key selection
system orientations and that the influence of the orientations gets stronger when the
process of interpreting the signals along this performance dimension is more
equivocal and uncertain. That is to say, it is more likely that the particular selection
system orientation—as part of a mental model that lets the individual dual leader
make sense of his/her environment—is activated to a higher degree when
information is less easy to interpret, increasing the impact of that particular
selection system. In turn, this suggests that if signals pertaining to particular
selection systems are more ambiguous and less available, the effect of differences in
strength of that selection system orientation on the perception of organizational
performance will be more pronounced. This will not just be the case in respect to the
individual manager, as considered in isolation, but even more so if one considers the
individual manager in the context of the social interactional processes we discussed
in Sect. 2.3. This study looks at the effect of the selection system orientations that
are measured at the same time as the perceptions of performance. The possible
effects of social interactions on the individual orientations is therefore already
included in what we measure. If we find that different managers have different
strengths of particular orientations this difference has, as it were, survived the
political process and the competition between cognitive frames. It is to be expected
that these surviving differences will express themselves most forcefully in those
areas where the scope of consequent social interaction is greatest, namely where the
signals are more ambiguous and less available, making the process of interpretation
more equivocal and uncertain.
In sum, market signals are readily available from accounting and relatively easy
to understand and their interpretation is the least equivocal and uncertain, allowing
Table 1 Equivocality and uncertainty in the interpretation of performance in each selection system
dimension
Type Signals Multiple
signals
Factual
data
Equivocality Uncertainty
Market Box-office, performance fees,
attendance rates
High Yes Low Low
Expert Newspaper reviews Moderate No High Moderate
Peer Conversations, word of mouth,
peer awards
Low No High High
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less room for the difference in the strength of the market selection orientation to
influence the interpretation of these data and assessing the organization’s position in
relation to its competitors. Signals with which to construct a perception of the
organization’s expert performance are also widely available, but more ambiguous,
so the influence of the difference between the dual leaders’ selection system
orientations in constructing their perception of their organization’s competitive
position will be stronger with regard to this dimension. Signals of the peer
performance dimension exhibit high levels of ambiguity and unavailability, so the
influence of the differences between the leaders’ selection system orientations are
likely to be at its strongest with respect to this dimension. These arguments suggest
the following hypothesis.
H2 The positive relationship between differences in dual leaders’ selection system
orientation and differences in their perceptions of the organization’s performance is
influenced by the equivocality and uncertainty pertaining to the interpretation of the
signals used to perceive performance along a particular dimension.
3 Research design
This study was designed to address how the mental model or cognitive frame of
managers influences the interpretation of organizational performance. Early studies
about managerial cognition mostly focus on personal characteristics as a proxy for
managerial cognition, whereas in this study we attempt to measure the selection
system orientation, as an important part of the individual manager’s mental model
or cognitive frame, directly. We focus on dual executive leaders, because of their
hierarchical equivalence and similar information needs. In the setting of a
performing arts industry the different performance dimensions exist next to each
other and are relatively similar in their impact on the organizations as a whole. We
utilized Lincoln’s (1984) method for dyadic analysis of similarity and dissimilarity,
and the construction of our key variables, making the dyad the unit of analysis. This
section further explains the source of the data, and the measurements of the
dependent, independent and control variables.
3.1 Setting and data
In the performing arts sector the dual executive leadership structure is common
(Reid and Karambayya 2009). Theatre companies, the empirical subject of this
study, are often led by one executive—the artistic director—who is responsible for
the artistic or creative objectives of the organization, and another—the managing
director—who is responsible for the organization’s commercial objectives. The
managers of performing arts organizations focus on particular signals in construct-
ing their perceptions of each specific type of organizational performance. For their
perception of market performance it is likely that they focus on sales: managers
usually have access to exact data on the number of visitors to their productions and
will often benchmark these figures. Many cultural industry studies focus on
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performance indicators based on audience attendance, such as box office
figures (Gemser et al. 2007; Zuckerman and Kim 2003). For their perception of
expert performance, managers may focus on expert reviews and on the perceptions
of other expert evaluators who decide about subsidies. These expert evaluators may
have different beliefs about quality from those expressed by the market at large
(Berger et al. 2010). European performing arts organizations are highly subsidized,
so those individuals who decide about subsidy levels also play an important role in
the industry. With respect to peer performance, peer opinions are usually highly
valued in artistic environments (Caves 2000; Eikhof and Haunschild 2007;
Hirschman 1983) and cultural organizations which display their commercial
aspirations openly may be perceived as producing poor quality (Caves 2000).
Data were gathered by means of a survey among UK performing arts
organizations where dual executive leadership structures are widely used. The
UK has a rich performing arts tradition: there are more than 800 theatre venues and
competition is fierce for the 76 % of the British public who attend a performance at
least once a year (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2010). Most performing
arts companies receive some form of subsidy, often from four specialist government
arts funding agencies: Arts Council England, the Arts Council of Northern Ireland,
the Scottish Arts Council and the Arts Council of Wales. Since multiple selection
systems are present in this industry, we can study a range of performance
dimensions at the same time.
The UK association of performing arts organizations (The Independent Theatre
Council) provided a list of 412 organizations, including theatre and dance
companies, from which we selected only those 186 organizations whose websites
revealed that they had a dual leadership structure. In spring 2011, we telephoned all
these performing arts organizations to ask both the artistic and managing director to
participate in the study by filling in our online survey. 224 individuals visited the
online survey. We matched 132 individuals as dual leaders of 66 organizations, 59
of which provide usable data, resulting in a response rate of 32 %.
3.1.1 Sample
No significant differences were found between the average scores on the key constructs
between early and late respondents, providing additional support that non-response is not a
major concern. Moreover, a Harman’s single factor test shows that there is no common
method variance between the dependent and independent variables.
Our data show interesting patterns in the composition of management in the UK
performing arts organizations. Table 2 shows demographic differences between the artistic
and managing directors in our sample. More females (76 %) than males (24 %) hold
managing director positions and the managing director’s 4-year average tenure is
considerably shorter than that of the average artistic director (11 years), who were also (at
46 years old) somewhat older than the average managing director (41 years old). Table 3
shows the revenue structure of the organizations, with subsidies (52 %) and box-office
(29 %) accounting for the bulk, and 19 % being made up of corporate funds and sponsorship.
Our limited sample size did not allow us to include the personal characteristics in
the main analysis. In our research design we already have measurements for the
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managerial cognitions, and therefore have less need for personal characteristics
which are mainly used as proxy for cognitions. We did include the distinctive
organizational characteristics in the performing arts, those mentioned above,
including the control variables mentioned below.
3.2 Dependent and independent variables
3.2.1 Difference in perception of performance
We developed the market, expert and peer performance measurement scales of
Bhansing et al. (2012) from one to five items (‘‘Appendix’’). The additional scale
items were based on the work of Harris (2001), Morgan and Berthon (2008) and
Richard et al. (2009). The operationalization for the organization’s market
performance (four items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.84), expert performance (five items,
Cronbach’s alpha 0.74) and peer performance (four items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.81)
proved to be reliable. Each item was scored on a five-point Likert-type scale by both
the artistic and managing director in terms of how they rated their own organization
(cf. Dess and Robinson 1984).
We calculated the three (peer, expert, and market) Euclidean distances between
the artistic and managing directors (Sohn 2001), for the perceptions of organiza-
tional performance.
Dij ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
k
ðxik  xjkÞ2
r
where Dij = the Euclidean distance between the artistic (i) and managing director
(j) of a particular organization (k), Xik = the score of the artistic director of the kth
organization, Xjk = the score of the managing director of the kth organization.
Table 2 Means and standard deviations of the artistic and managing directors’ perceptions of perfor-
mance, selection system orientations and demographics
Artistic director Managing director Across organizations
M SD M SD M SD
Perception of performance
Market 3.85 0.60 3.73 0.72 3.79 0.54
Expert 3.82 0.67 3.80 0.64 3.81 0.54
Peer 4.17 0.71 4.09 0.69 4.13 0.57
Selection system orientations
Market 4.51 0.51 4.41 0.53 4.46 0.38
Expert 3.68 0.61 3.68 0.76 3.68 0.59
Peer 3.65 0.59 3.89 0.63 4.26 0.47
Demographics
Gender (% female) 49 – 76 – – –
Tenure (years) 11 8 4 3 – –
Age (years) 46 10 41 11 – –
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3.2.2 Selection system orientations and dyadic differences
We extended each selection system orientation measurement of Bhansing et al.
(2012) with two new scale items (‘‘Appendix’’). These additional scale items were
based on the work of Voss et al. (2000) and Wijnberg and Gemser (2000). This
improved the reliability of the market (five items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.79), expert
(five items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.80) and peer (five items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.70)
selection system orientation measurements. Each item was scored by both the
artistic and managing director on a five-point Likert-type scale. We followed
Lincoln’s (1984)1 method of analyzing relations in dyads by constructing a measure
of similarity/dissimilarity between scores of the dual leaders (dyadic difference).
We mean-centered the orientation type scales and multiplied each of the artistic
directors’ orientation scores by those of the managing director.
3.2.3 Control variables
We included several organizational characteristics as control variables because the
main focus of the study is at the level of the dyad, averaging the responses of both
executives in each case to obtain the organizational score. The self-reports show
high and significant correlations between the dual leaders’ perceptions of these core
organizational characteristics (see Table 4 for the correlation matrix). We control
for the organization’s income sources (the percentages from subsidies and box-
office) and for organizational size [the number of fulltime staff equivalents (FTE)].
We constructed dummy variables to account for the fact that some companies only
focus on children theatre (non-kids = 0) and others on a wider spectrum of non-kids
shows (non-kids = 1) and whether the organization toured (touring = 1) their
productions or only performed in their ‘home’ venues (touring = 0) and whether
they produced plays (theatre = 1) or other types (theatre = 0) of performances
(theatre).
In addition, we constructed a variable to measure the degree of overlap between
the executives’ orientations. If one dual leader scored a 4 on expert orientation and
the other a score of 5, then they had an overlap of 0.8 (Gibson and Vermeulen
2003). The overlap was calculated for each orientation scale and then we computed
the composite variable (selection system overlap) by summing the overlap from
each selection system dimension.
1 According to Lincoln (1984), in attempting to predict relationships between dyads, the properties of
each individual are likely to have effects, and so should be specified in a statistical model, and how those
properties combine must also be taken into account. Our model therefore includes a variable for the
interaction between the dual leaders’ orientations (dyadic difference). This approach allowed us to test the
influence of combinations of individual properties and their inter-relationships instead of just testing the
individual properties or measuring the distance between them. When the properties concerned the same
variable for both executives, the interaction can be seen as a similarity/dissimilarity effect: the more
negative its coefficient the larger the effects of differences, while positive and significant signs indicate
the influence of similarity.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Results
Before the hypotheses tests are presented, the data is explored, showing some
insights regarding mean scores of the artistic and managing directors’ orientations
and perceptions of organizational performance in each selection system dimensions.
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3. The correlation matrix confirms
the scale validations in that correlations between orientations are not high,
indicating that market, expert and peer orientation are relatively independent
constructs.
As mentioned before, we followed Lincoln (1984) and modeled perceived
performance differences to account for the similarity/dissimilarity between the dual
leaders’ selection system orientations. A negative sign for an orientation difference
variable indicates that larger orientation differences are related to larger perceived
performance dissimilarities (Lincoln 1984).
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimated (two-tailed) a set of regression models
(Table 5). The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between
market orientation differences and perceived market performance differences
(b = -0.225, p B 0.10). A similar effect is visible between the artistic and
managing directors’ expert orientation differences and perceived expert perfor-
mance differences (b = -0.357, p B 0.01). Regarding the peer dimension, we find
that larger differences in the orientations are related to more similarities in
perceptions of peer performance (b = 0.265, p B 0.05). This supports hypothesis 1
where it concerns the market and expert selection system dimension.
With respect to hypothesis 2, we compare the regression coefficients of the
independent variables across the three models (because there are no differences in
the scaling properties of the measures). We expected that the orientation difference
coefficient would become larger for the more equivocal and uncertain performance
dimensions. Table 5 shows that the regression coefficients of orientation difference
are larger and stronger in model 1b than in model 1a (model 1a: b = -0.225,
p B 0.10; model 1b: b = -0.357, p B 0.01). Also, model 1b explains considerably
more variance in perceived performance differences than model 1a (model 1:
Table 4 Correlation between dual leaders’ scores of organizational characteristics
Subsidy A Sales A Size A Touring A Theatre A Non-kids A
Subsidy B 0.748**
Sales B 0.597**
Size B 0.757**
Touring B 1.000**
Theatre B 0.926**
Non-kids B 0.934**
‘‘… A’’ is response of artistic director. ‘‘… B’’ is response of managing director
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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R2 = 0.262; model 2: R2 = 0.465). However, no support is found with regard to the
peer dimension, because the relationship between peer orientation differences is
related to similarity in performance perception along the peer dimension (see
above). This supports hypothesis 2 where it concerns the market and expert
selection system dimension.
The regression results also show that companies with a higher box-office are less
dissimilar in their perceptions of organizational performance along each dimension
(model 1a: b = -0.273, p B 0.05; model 1b: b = -0.425, p B 0.01; model 1c:
b = -0.245, p B 0.05). Companies that produce plays have dual leaders that are
more dissimilar in their perception of market and expert performance, but this effect
is not significant along the peer dimension (model 1a: b = 0.241, p B 0.05; model
1b: b = 0.230, p B 0.05; model 1c: b = -0.089, p[ 0.10).
4.1.1 Post hoc analysis
The multiple regression models have ten predictor variables and they are estimated
on dyadic data from 59 organizations. As a rule of thumb, it is recommended that
the observed statistical power exceeds 0.8. The post hoc statistical power for model
1a (0.84) model 1b (0.99) and model 1c (0.99) all pass this test at p B 0.5 (Cohen
1988; Soper 2014).
4.2 Robustness checks
We ran additional analyses to check the robustness of our findings. To exclude the
possibility that the selection system orientations in themselves were strong
predictors of perceived performance, we performed a regression analysis to test if
there were direct relationships between the strength of selection system orientations
and perceptions of organizational performance along the matching dimensions at the
individual level, but we found no significant relationships for peer (b = -0.100,
p = 0.281), expert (b = -0.008, p = 0.933) or market (b = -0.038, p = 0.684)
orientations. In addition, we performed a structural equation analysis (Schumacker
and Lomax 2004) in which we ran models 1a and 1b simultaneously. This also
showed that the hypothesized relationship between orientation difference and
difference in perception of performance was stronger in the expert dimension than
in the market dimension.
We explored whether differences in the strength of the selection system
orientations could be explained by demographic variances, via a model that
included age, tenure and gender variables, estimated as suggested by Lincoln
(1984), but only found a significant (positive) influence of similarity in dual
executives’ ages on the difference in their expert selection system orientations
(b = 0.301, p B 0.05)—i.e. the closer their ages, the more different was the
strength of their expert selection system orientations, suggesting that selection
system orientations is a complex phenomenon and are influenced by many factors
throughout artistic and managing directors’ careers. Introducing the same demo-
graphic variables into models 1a, 1b and 1c produced no substantive changes in the
estimates of the effects of the orientation difference variables.
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5 Discussion
The main aim of this study is to better understand dual executive leaders’
perceptions of their organizations’ performance, and especially, the drivers of
differences in performance perceptions. To do this, we focused on managers’
selection system orientations, an essential structural element of their mental model.
We also presented arguments why the levels of equivocality and uncertainty could
create differences between perceived performance along different dimensions and
how signals of greater ambiguity and unavailability allowed more room for the
managers’ orientations to affect their perception of organizational performance.
The first major finding of this study shows why dual leaders have different
perceptions of their organization’s performance. Our results suggest that the
differences between top managers in their selection system orientations are
antecedents for differences in their perceptions of organizational performance. As
expected, differences in dual leaders’ perceptions of performance are greater, the
greater the differences between their orientations in both the market and expert
dimension. This was not so for the peer performance dimension—here, the more
similar their peer orientations are, the greater the difference in their perceptions of
performance. So managers with strongly dissimilar peer orientations seem to have
weighed the available peer opinions similarly. A possible explanation for this arises
from the interactive and discursive nature of the peer evaluations themselves. Peer
evaluations—in the industry that is the subject of this study—arise in a smaller
community of peers with a high degree of interaction, at least among those peers
they consider equals. More than is the case with the signals of market and expert
performance, the signals of peer performance arise from discursive processes among
peers, similar to the discursive processes among managers studied by Kwon et al.
(2014), which makes it more likely that even dual leaders with very dissimilar peer
orientations will encounter the same outcomes of that discursive process and will
find it difficult to interpret the available signals differently.
The second major finding of this study is that the influence of differences in
selection system orientations is greater if the perception and interpretation of
performance can be characterized as more equivocal and uncertain. Specifically,
market performance data are the most available and least ambiguous, expert
performance data is less available and more ambiguous, and peer performance data
usually the least available and most ambiguous. Our results show that the impact of
the differences in managers’ selection system orientations on their perceptions of
performance in the same dimension is indeed greater for expert selection and less
for market selection, while (as discussed above) the result on the peer selection
dimension was different to what we expected.
At a more general level, our results provide new insights for the managerial
cognition literature concerning the impact of particular mental models on
managerial interpretation of signals. This study suggests that the cognitions of
managers not only determine what type of issues they focus on, but also how they
interpret the outcomes of organizational behavior with regard to these issues. Our
empirical evidence shows that selection system orientations are fundamental to how
Selection system orientations as an explanation for the… 925
123
managers construct their understandings of their business environments and that the
way top managers value the opinions of evaluators influences how they weigh
signals and how they process them in building their understanding of events.
Furthermore, it suggests that signals of performance do not speak for themselves in
the strategy making process, but are subjected to interpretations of managers, and
thus that any subsequent interactions and decision regarding these signals are based
on the initial interpretations of managers.
5.1 Limitations
The dual-leadership structure lends itself well to studying the differences between
managers with regard to their perception of organizational performance, because the
dual leaders have structurally equivalent positions, so we do not have to control for
the rank in the hierarchy, and they are together at the top of one single organization,
so the object of their perception is exactly the same. With this advantage comes the
disadvantage that our results should be interpreted with caution before being applied
to managers that are not in the same structural position as the dual leaders, for
instance, the differences in perception between the CEO and another board member
or between a line-manager and a staff manager. Of course there are also further
limitations to this study, which affect the generalization of the results. First, we
examined one setting in one country. Therefore, we could not take into account
sectoral or national differences with respect to the processes of perception and
interpretation. Also, the interpretation of the results of this study is limited by the
number of participating organizations—more responses would have provided
stronger effects in our statistical models. Second, the industry we studied is
populated by organizations that recognize very explicitly multiple organizational
performance objectives, along multiple dimensions. This could affect the extent to
which individual orientations have an influence over perceived performance.
Managers in organizations that aim to perform only, or mostly, along one single
dimension might also perceive this performance more uniformly. Thirdly, we argue
that different performance dimensions differ in the extent to which the signals along
a dimension will contribute to the equivocality and uncertainty of the process of
interpretation, but we did not empirically test whether the managers themselves
experienced these different levels of equivocality and uncertainty. Finally, we do
not investigate a possible reverse causality, namely that disagreements between the
dual leaders, and especially the differences in perceptions of organizational
performance within organizations, influence external evaluators’ perceptions of
organizational performance, which in turn produce those signals the managers
interpret.
5.2 Managerial implications
In general, cognitive differences that may exist in management teams have been
argued to provide information diversity at the top of the organization and to be
beneficial to the organization as a whole (e.g. Alvarez and Svejenova 2005). The
dual executive leadership structure confronts the upper echelon of an organization
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with the possibility that signals of performance can be interpreted differently. This
is important, as perceptions of past performance are the bases for planning future
strategies. Organizations with a single CEO structure may react more speedily to
changes in the environment but dual leaders may be more effective in making high
quality strategic decisions, since they can incorporate different or more complete
perceptions of the organizational environment and its performance in their strategic
decisions.
If the dual leaders disagree in their perceptions of organizational performance
this can, on the one hand, amplify the disadvantages of cognitive differences. In
particular, such differences give more scope for managers to disagree about the
effectiveness of past strategic choices, the advisability of particular strategies in the
future and the opportunity to argue in behalf of their personal interest. However,
being more aware of the effects of their differing orientations and the effects of
equivocality and uncertainty should allow managers to avoid future disagreements
more easily. Therefore, the results of this study could help managers to recognize
and better deal with this specific type of disagreement.
On the other hand, where there is no consensus about performance, this can
increase the need to collect more signals and to discuss their ambiguousness.
There are many circumstances in which this need to be better informed and,
especially, subject information to a higher degree of discussion could be to the
advantage of the organization and its eventual performance. Again, the results of
this study can contribute to convincing managers of the reasonableness of such
further investments in informing themselves and considering the available
information in depth.
In a more narrow sense, the results of this study allow organizations to make
more reasoned decisions about how great the differences between members of a
management team should be—especially between dual leaders. Given a desired
level of difference, the organizations can actively strive to fill particular functional
positions with individuals with selection system orientations of particular strengths.
Finally, this study has implications for situations in which managers are themselves
sources of information about their organization’s performance to outsiders, for
instance, in the context of reporting to a subsidizing institution or in a close
collaboration with another organization. By being aware that different managers can
have different perceptions of their own organization’s performance, one can better
select the one whose perception will be most useful to the organization in that
particular context.
5.3 Further research
We hope this study will stimulate more research in the perception of
organizational performance, as this subject is still underexplored. The limitations
we discussed above point the way towards specific extensions of this study: for
instance, by also including the differences with regard to organizational
performance between managers who are not hierarchically equivalent. Other
important questions, which may have significant implications for management
and strategic literature, remain unanswered. For example, ‘‘Does reported
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organizational performance capture the state of an organization and how does this
reported performance relate to the performance as observed by specific
stakeholders, and especially by the organization’s managers themselves?’’ Our
paper shows that dual leaders can have quite different perceptions of organiza-
tional performance, which implies that at least one of them has a perception of
performance that differs from the reported performance. If managers’ perceptions
of performance are different from reported performance, it seems of great
importance to further investigate factors that lead managers to interpret signals of
performance in particular ways. This study focused on the divergences in the
perception of the organizational performance and did not investigate the effects of
subsequent interaction between the managers. Therefore, it provides a useful
foundation for more detailed studies of precisely these interactive processes,
given the expected differences in original perception. Finally, as briefly
mentioned at the start of this paper, the perception of past performance is the
basis on which decisions about future strategies are made. Future studies should
analyze how the differences between top managers in respect to their perception
of past performance influence future strategic choices and organizational
performance.
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International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
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Appendix: Scale items
Peer orientation
I think that my peers are a good judge of the quality of our organization’s
productions.
I am often aware of my peers’ opinions about our productions.
In the decisions I make, it is especially useful to consider the opinions of my
peers.
I sometimes wonder what effect my decisions will have on the opinions of my
peers.
The opinions of my peers are an important measure of the success of our
productions.
Expert orientation
I think that experts are a good judge of the quality of our organization’s
productions.
I am often aware of expert’s opinions about our productions.
In the decisions I make, it is especially useful to consider the opinions of experts.
I sometimes wonder what effect my decisions have on the opinions of experts.
Opinions of experts are an important measure of success of our productions.
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Market orientation
I think that our audience is a good judge the quality of our organization’s
productions.
I am often aware of our audience’s opinions about our productions.
In the decisions I make, it is especially useful to consider the opinions of our
audience.
I sometimes wonder what effect my decisions have on the opinions of our
audience.
The opinions of our audience are an important measure of success of our
productions.
Peer performance
In terms of […] over the past 5 years my organization belongs to the…
[familiarity of your company amongst other companies within the industry]
[a good reputation amongst peers]
[growth in the appreciation among peers for our performances]
[serving as an example of good practice for other companies]
Expert performance
In terms of […] over the past 5 years my organization belongs to the…
[the positive reviews from critics]
[a good reputation amongst experts]
[growth in the appreciation among experts for our performances]
[attention from the media]
[success in attracting funds from the art council]
Market performance
In terms of […] over the past 5 years my organization belongs to the…
[attendance rate (% of the maximum number of occupiable seats) during the
performances]
[a good reputation with the audience]
[growth in attendance rates]
[sold out performances]
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